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Brokers-Compensation-Evidence- Dual Agency.--Findings
that defendant real estate broker \vas middleman and not
agent or either party in securing lease for plaintiff are not
supported by evidence showing as matter of law that broker
was not agent with limited authority, but was, as disclosed by
his own testimony of arrangement between him and plaintiff,
vested with authority to sec if he "could get one of the deals"
from owner, that is, with owner building improvements as
offered by plaintiff, or at lesser rent without improvements
as otr'ered by owner, thereby showing he had right or duty to
exercise some discretion with reg·ard to terms on which principals would deal.
[8] !d.-Compensation-Dual Agency.-H defendant was acting as
broker under Real Estate Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10000 et
seq.) in procuring lease of realty for plaintiff, policy of law
against dual representation ( § 10176, subd. (d)) is applicable
to him.
[9] !d.-Compensation-Dual Agency.-A real estate broker who
acted as agent for both lessee and lessor in securing lease
cannot recover compensation from either unless he disclosed
to both his agreement to receive compensation from both.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Joseph M. Maltby, Judge. Reversed.
Action by lessees against real estate broker for declaratory
relief. J udgmeut for defendant reversed.
Lyle M. Stevens for Appellants.
Leo Friedman and Orlan S. Friedman for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-By his complaint in this action plaintiff
sought to have it declared that he was not under obligation
to pay defendant an amount agreed upon as compensation for
sevices rendered by defendant in procuring a lease of certain
real property for plaintiff. Defendant by cross-complaint
sought to recover said compensation from plaintiff. Judgment was rendered in favor of defendant, and plaintiff has
appealed.
From the trial court's findings it appears that E. D.
Mitchell owned certain real property in the city of Long
Beach. Plaintiff was desirous of leasing the property from
Mitchell and, on October 24, 1952, he authorized defendant
to submit to Mitchell an offer to lease the property. It was
thereupon orally agreed between plaintiff and defendant that
if plaintiff were able to secure a lease of the property he
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would pay defendant 5 per cent of the net profits from the
business to be conducted on the property by plaintiff. 'l'he
oral agreement was followed by a written agreement on
October 27, 1952. The offer from plaintiff to Mitchell for
such lease was transmitted by defendant to and refused by
Mitchell. But on October 28, 1952, Mitchell authorized defendant to submit a written offer for a lease of the property
to plaintiff, varying from plaintiff's offer, which provided
that Mitchell would pay defendant a 3 per cent commission.
'l'he latter offer was submitted by defendant to plaintiff and
was accepted by him. Thereafter, on November 4, 1952,
plaintiff and Mitchell, without defendant's participation,
executed a lease of the property. Mitchell had no knowledge
of the 5 per cent agreement between plaintiff and defendant,
but plaintiff knew defendant was to receive a 3 per cent commission from Mitchell. The court then found that defendant
was acting as a middleman to bring plaintiff and Mitchell
together and was not an agent of either, hence the 5 per cent
agreement was valid and enforceable because in such a situation the rule was not applicable that an agent may not recover
compensation from both principals unless full disclosure was
made to each. The court also found that defendant had no
authority to vary the terms of or exercise any discretion
in connection with plaintiff's offer to Mitchell and the same
was true of the offer from Mitchell to plaintiff. It was admitted that defendant was, at the time of the transaction
here involved, a licensed real estate broker.
The evidence is as follows: Defendant testified tl1at, before
contacting plaintiff, he knew Mitchell wanted to lease the
property, but had no listing from him. About October 24,
1952, he approached plaintiff, who was engaged in the hamburger sandwich business, and talked to him about leasing
the Mitchell property. Thereafter three writings on plaintiff's
stationery, addressed to defendant, setting forth the agreement as to defendant's commission between the parties, were
signed by plaintiff.* The first document was dated October
24, 1952, the second October 27, 1952, and the third November
5, 1952. The first two were signed on October 27, 1952. The
first docnment stated that defendant was therewith authorized
"to offer for me" (plaintiff) a proposition to lease a portion
of MitcJJrll 's property in the city of Long Beach at a rental
*Apparently the papers were signed in blank by plaintiff and filled
in by defendant but no question is here presented that these documents
were agreed to by plaintiff.
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a vvriting (hereinafter called fourth writing) addressed to
defendant in which Mitchell agreed to lease the property to
plaintiff for a term of 10 years at
per month; no provision was made for
by Mitchell and it embodied
the same basic terms as later appeared in the
lease executed
and Mitchell; Mitchell also agreed
therein to pay defendant 3 per cent of the total rental as a
commission.'' Defendant advised plaintiff of
Mitchell's offer and plaintiff
on the fourth writing
his
thereof. Defendant was paid the 3 per cent
Mitchell at ihe time the fourth
was signed and
before
and Mitchell executed the lease. Defendant
testified he did not remember ·whether he told lVlitehell he was
a commission from plaintiff. The lease was signed
on November ·1, 1952. Mitchell testified that defendant took
no
in any negotiations after getting the fourth writing
signed by both parties.
[1] Plaintiff's case is based on the rule that "[\V]here an
has assumed to act in a double capacity, a principal
who has no knowledge of such dual representation . . . may
avoid the transaction. Actual injury is not the principle
upon which the law holds such transaction voidable; rather,
the law holds it voidable in order to prevent the agent from
putting himself in a
where he will be tempted to
betray his principal. . . . To this point l\ifec:hem in his work
on agency, second
volume 2, section 2138, page 1715,
says: ' . . . an agent who is relied upon to exercise, in behalf
of his principal, his skill, judgment, knowledge or influence,
will not be permitted without such principal's full knowledge
and consent, to undertake to
the other party also
in the same transaction. Such condurt is a fraud upon his
principal, and not only will the agent not be entitled to compensation for servicrs so rendered, but the contract or dealings
made or had by the agent, >Yhile so
also for the other
party without the knowledge or consent of the principal, are
not binding upon the latter, and if they still remain executory,
be may repudiate them on that ground, or, if they have been
exeeuted in whole or in part, he may by acting promptly and
before the rights of innocent parties have intervened, restore
the eonsideration received, rescind the contraet and reeover
back the property or rights with which he has parted under
it. It makes no difference that the princjpal was not in fact
injured, or that the agent intended no wrong or that the
other party acted in g-ood faith; the double agency is a fraud
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upon the principal and he is not bound.' " (Vice v. Thacker,
30 Cal.2d 84, 90 [180 P.2d 4] ; see also Glenn v. Rice, 174 Cal.
269 [162 P. 1020] ; Butler v. Solano Land Co., 203 Cal. 231
[263 P. 530]; Gorclon v. Beck, 196 Cal. 768 [239 P. 309]; 2
Cal.Jur.2d, Agency, § 107; 9 CaLJ ur.2d, Brokers, § 77; Rest.,
§ 390 et seq.; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10176, subd. (d).)
[2] It is also held that neither principal is liable for the
commission unless both knew of the dual representation,
even if one does know of it he is not liable if the other does
not, which is the situation we have here, because, as above noted,
knew defendant was to receive a commission from
MitchelL 'rhe rule is thns stated: ''His
's] contract for compensation beh1g thus tainted, the law will not
permit him to enforce it against either party . . . . And the
fact that the party whom he sues was aware of the double
agency and of the payment, or agreement to pay, compensation by the other party, and consented thereto, does not entitle
him to recover. He must show knowledge by both parties.
One party might willingly consent, believing that the advantage would accrne to him, to the detriment of the other. The
law will not tolerate such an arrangement, except with the
knowledge and consent of both, and will enter into no inquiry
to determine whether or not the particular negotiation was
fairly conducted by the agent. It leaves him as it finds him,
affording him no relief." (Glenn v. Rice, snpra, 17 4 Cal.
269, 272; see also Gordon v. Beck, supra, 196 Cal. 768; Riggins
v. Patterson, 37 Cal.App. 319 [174 P. 119]; cases collected
14 A.L.R. 464; SO A.L.R. 1075.)
The question presented, therefore, is whether the evidence
shows as a matter of la1Y that the arrangement did not fall
within the so-calle(1 middleman exception to the dual representation rule later discussed herein. Defendant contends
that plaintiff does not question the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the findings favorable to the exception and that
they show that defendant had no discretion in exercising
his agency and hence he was what is sometimes euphemistically called a middleman; that under such circumstances the
agent may receive compensation from both principals without
disclosing to either that he had an arrangement with both
for a commission. [3] The exception is stated: "If the
scope of a broker's employment is limited to bringing parties
together so that they may negotiate their own contract, he
is a mere middleman. Upon performance, he is entitled to
compensation from each of them who has agreed to pay him,
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en·n though the others are Ullaware of such employment.
[ 4] But if a broker engaged by both parties is clothed with
some diseretion in the matter of advising or negotiating the
transaction. he eannot recover compensation from either, unless both of them knew of the double agency at the time of
the transaction." (9 CaLJur.2d, Brokers, § 77; ser also Clm·k
v.
125 Cal. 276 [57 P. 985] ; Green v. Robertson, 64
Cal. 7:"5 [28 P. 446]; King v. l?ccd, 21 Cal.App. 229 [141
l'. 41]; Carothers v. Caine, 38 Cal.App. 71 [175 P. 478];
v.
109 Cal.App. 662 [293 P.
; Anderson v. Tlwcher, 76 Cal.App.2d 50 [172 P.2d 533]; Ilooper·
Y.
114 Cal.App.2d 802 [2:-il P.2d 330]; Butler v.
Solano Land Co., 8Hpra, 203 Cal. 231; Hest., Agency, §§ 390394.) [5) 'I' he 1vonl "midd1eman" is a short term for
describing a situation in which the agent has limited authority,
that
he has no power to and does not negotiate the terms
on "Which the principals will deal, yet he is an
or he
may possibly be an independent contractor, or falls in one
of 1he recognized legal categories.* [6] Being so limited,
there is no opportunity for him to sacrifice the interests of
one prineipal to the detriment of the other and the reason
for ihe dual representation rule fails.
"While plaintiff could have been more speeific in his attack
on the findings (he claims the findings that defendant "Was
a middleman and not an agent for either party ar8 conclusions of law), it is clear that his basie premise is that the
evid(•nce shows as a matter of law that this was not a situiion where an agent had limited authority-no right or duty
to exercise discretion or negotiate in regard to the terms
upon which the prineipals would deal.
[7] The \\Titings shed Ho light on the scope of defendani's anthority but defendant's own testimony of the arrangement between him and plaintiff shows as a matter of law
that this is not a ease of an agent with limited authority
and hence the findings are not supported by the evidence.
It is true, as pointed out by defendant, that plaintiff testified
in regard to the first writing that he was to pay the 5 per
cent commission if defendant got the lease from Mitchell
on the terms there stated, which would indicate that defendaut's sole power was to transmit the offer, and the same is
true as to lVIitchell and his offer, the fourth writing, but
*Commonly a middleman is a trader who buys commodities from the
producer and sells them to the retailer or sometimes directly to the
consumer.
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plaintiff's offer was rejected by Mitchell, and according to
defendant's own version (heretofore quoted), he was to see
if he ''could get one of the deals,'' from Mitchell, that is,
with Mitchell building the improvements as offered by plaintiff, or at a le,ser rent without improvements as offered by
Mitchell. There was, therefore, vested in defendant, authority
to
with Mitchell and get one deal or the otherexercise some discretion. The fact that the lease was drawn
and executed without any participation by defendant is not
significant, because the basic terms thereof had already been
stated in Mitchell's offer and plaintiff's acceptance of it (the
fourth writing). It is undisputed that defendant was engaged
in the real estate brokerage business and one of his specialties
was the negotiation of leases. He said that plaintiff could
not obtain a lease from Mitchell on his own initiative and
that he was to receive the 5 per cent commission for getting
a lease from Mitchell. It appears from defendant's testimony and the undisputed evidence that the transaction was
one in which defendant was more than a mere errand boyservant for plaintiff and Mitchell, to carry offers from one
to the other. Although it has been held that whether a
person is a "middleman" is generally one of fact ( Clm·k v.
Allen, supra, 125 Cal. 276), it is one of law here on defendant's own testimony as to the arrangement.
The cases in whic:h it has been held that the agent had no
discretion and could receive commissions from both parties
are distinguishable. In Clark v. Allen, supra, 125 Cal. 276,
and Green v. Robertson, supra, 64 Cal. 75, the facts do not
appear. In J(ing v. Reed, s~tpra, 24 Cal.App. 229, the broker
had only one fixed price which he could transmit to the
proposed bnyer. In Ca1·othe1·s v. Caine, supra, 38 Cal.App.
71, only an offer was to be transmitted. Moreover, the last
cited case is contrary to Butler v. Solano Land Co., supra,
203 Cal. 231, and is impliedly overruled by that case. In
Kennedy v. Johnson, supra, 109 Cal.App. 662, the negotiations and deal were made by the principals and the broker
only brought them in contact. In Anderson v. Thacher, supra,
76 Cal.App.2d 50, Hooper v. Mayfield, supra, 114 Cal.App.
2d 802, and Butler v. Solano Lancl Co., supra, 208 Cal. 231,
the rule was stated but found not applicable in those cases.
Consideration should also be given to the Real Estate Law
regulating the business of real estate brokers and salesmen.
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10000 et seq.) That statute states
the policy against dual representation. A broker's license
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may be revoked or suspended if, while he is ''performing or
attempting to perform" any of the acts within the scope
of the regulatory act, he is guilty of ''acting for more than
one party in a transaction without the knowledge or consent of
all parties thereto." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10176, subd. (d).)
The act defines a broker as one who ''offers to buy [or sell],
lists, or solicits for prospective purchasers" of real estate
and also one who for compensation "negotiates . . . leases
[of], or offers to lease" real estate. (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 10131.) "One act, for a compensation" of "offering for
another to buy or sell . . . real estate" or "leasing . . .
real estate" shall constitute acting as a broker. (Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 10134.) [8] If defendant was acting as a
broker then under the act the policy against dual representation is applicable to him. The cases holding that various
activities and scopes of authority were not within the actthat the agent was only a "middleman "-involved the exercise of less authority than defendant exercised in this case.
In Freeman v. Jergins, 125 Cal.App.2d 536 [271 P.2d 210],
Shaffer v. Beinhon1, 190 Cal. 569 [213 P. 960), JicKenna v.
Edwards, 19 Cal.App.2d 327 [65 P.2d 810], and Crofoot
v. Spivak, 113 Cal.App.2d 146 [248 P.2d 45}, the one claiming compensation was only to find and introduce to the
seller a person who might be interested as a buyer; he neither
had nor exereised any other authority. In other cases the
authority was broader and a different result was reached
(see II oopcr v. Mayfield, supra, 114 Cal. A pp.2d 556 ; .Abrams
v. Ouston, 110 Cal.App.2d 556 [243 P.2d 109] ; Rhode v.
Bartholomew, 94 Cai.App.2d 272 [210 P.2d 768]; Davis v.
Chipman, 210 Cal. 609 [293 P. 40]; Ryan v. TValker, 35
Cal.App. 116 [Hi9 P. 417]; Crarn v. McNeil, 32 Cal.App.
101 [162 P. 140] ).
[9] Applying the rule announced in the above cited cases
to the facts of this case leads us to the inevitable conclusion
that defendant acted as agent for both plaintiff and Mitchell,
and he, therefore, cannot recover compensation from either
unless he disclosed to both his agreement to receive compensation from both. This he admittedly failed to do.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.

